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NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEMS:
A REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT EFFORTS AND THE PROSPECTS*
BY

DR. M. 0. OJO
Al,IIDct
article attempts to: (i) provide an up-to-date profile of
This article provided the most recent information on
Nigeria's external debt problem; (ii) evaluate the current
efforts being made to reduce Nigeria's huge external debt
approaches to the debt problem; and (iii) examine new
burden. In order to evaluate such efforts, it discussed both
options for debt reduction. Following this introduction, the
theoretical and practical issues on the international managearticle is organised into four main sections. Section I contains
ment of the debt crisis. It was observed that the wide gulf
a description of the power structure of international debt
between the debtor countries and the creditors, especially
management which will throw more light on the roles of
the commercial banks has been significantly bridged in the
various participants in the external debt game. Section II
last three years. The article noted that while Nigeria has
provides an up-to-date profile of Nigeria's external debt,
made commendable progress in reducing her debt burden, a
while section III reviews the solutions which are currently
lot more still needs to be done to make the efforts to have
being used to reduce the debt burden. Section IV also exathe desirable positive impact. More astute use of the emermines the other approaches which have been used by other
ging market-oriented options for debt reduction must be
indebted countries or are currently being put forward as
combined with vigorous efforts aimed at reducing external
workable proposals.
payments problems. The article concluded that current debt
management efforts should be part of a medium/long term
I. THE POWER STRUCnJRE OF INTERNATIONAL
look at the national external borrowing strategies which
DEBT MANAGEMENT
should properly be integrated with the overall macroeconomic policy framework. It also emphasised the importance
International debt management process is naturally
of accurate and up-to-date information for effective debt
focussed on creditor and debtor countries, while the multimanagement and strategies.
lateral financial institutions appear to stand in the middle.
Each group is not as homogeneous as would be expected.
Introduction
The creditors can be categorised by the types of loans
they extended. Firstly, there are official creditors whose
It is no exaggeration to claim that Nigeria's huge external
debt burden is one of the hard knots of the Structural
loans are provided or guaranteed by governments or official
agencies (mostly in developed countries). International
Adjustment Programme introduced in 1986 to put the
loan negotiations covered by this group of creditors are
economy on a sustainable path of recovery. The corollary
handled under the framework of the Paris Oub. The Paris
of this statement is that if only the high level of debt service
payments could be reduced significantly, Nigeria would be
Club, made up mainly of the Organisation of Economic
in a position to finance a larger volume of domestic investCo-operation and Development (OECD) countries, was set
ment which would enhance growth and employment. But,
up in 1956 to deal with the Latin American debt problem,
roore often than not, a debtor has only limited room to
but has since expanded its scope to cover African and other
manage a debt crisis to advantage. Yet, Nigeria's external
debt negotiations. Under an informal setting, Paris Oub
debt outstanding was much less than $1.0 billion in 1977.
meetings are chaired by a senior official of the French
By 1988, total debt outstanding was over $26.0 billion at
Treasury which also serves as the Club's secretariat. A debtor
a time when the total value of exports from which such debt
country that has a problem with its official debt first approais serviced had declined by over a half in real terms. Such
ches the Paris Club which then evaluates the situation on an
huge external debt stock with the associated debt service
individual basis although the Club has over time adopted
has hampered economic growth and employment through
a common approach to ensure consistency in similar negoprincipally putting a limit on imports which are critical for
tiations. One of the basic prerequisites for Paris Club negotiations to become effective is for the debtor country, which
domestic productive activities. The emergence of the current
must be a member of the International Monetary Fund
international debt crisis in the early 1980s has been accom(IMF), to have in force a stabilization programme with the
panied by intense debate on finding effective solutions to it.
At the same time, Nigeria has made conscious efforts to
IMF. Secondly, commercial creditors are made up of interreduce the external debt burden in order partly to restore
national commercial banks mainly in Western Europe and
external and internal equilibrium in the economy. While
North America. They ext{;nd their credits to governments
these efforts have provided some relief, the debt burden is
or their agencies as well as to private enterprises. This group
still unbearable.
of creditors come under the framework of the London
In the light of the above, it is very relevant to continue
Club (Commercial Bank Advisory Committee) which has no
to review the national external debt management strategies
formal secretariat. The Institute for International Finance
particularly in the context of the rapidly changing interin Washington, D.C. has since 1983 acted as the coordinator
national economic environment. In this connection, this
for commercial bank negotiations. Like the Paris Club, the
London Club adopts a common approach in debt negotiations and one of the conditions for an agreement with the
* This article was originally prepared by the author as an information
material which relied on many sources which are duly acknowledged
club is that debtor countries are required to have stabilizain the bibliography. I also appreciate the research assistance given
tion programmes with the IMF.
by Messrs F. 0. Odoko, 0. A. Ogunlana and
of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
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owed mainly to the commercial banks. As of 1988, the total
external debt outstanding of the HICs (exd11cti• r.osta Rica
and Jamaica) amounted to US $477 .4 billion with an nenge
debt service ratio of 39 .6 per cent. The.otla group of co•tries comprises the low-income African Ui--•ies ..._
total external debt outstanding wa.• estiowal al US $68.D
billion in 1988 with an average debt service aliD of n .0 . cent. The bulk of their external debt is owal tu a,,wswoents
Although the countries in the two 8f011f1S ae p:aenlly
poor and faced with varied ecollOlllic I*• I I
• tlae debt
crisis of the first group dominates die inta::wiNM dcbt
debate. The debt crisis of the low-iacome Atiicaa ._...,,-es
is also serious given the high letd of powsty ill dlae matries and their bleak economic JIIWPOCls
To any casual observer, the intcsMi+M 4lcbt c:rilis
appears inherently intractable. A daar lblily ~ dat die
root cause ofthe complexdebfl w9t.tiefi--lirsiathepoaa
structure of international debt - - .. . . .111 w1•i1:1- didaks
the perceptions of the putic:ipalllls • to
migim of die
crisis, the nature of the aolutiDas hci•• g z
..a
necessary adjustment required..
In this regard, if the CNIIMUllg cs; -i-4s -,f crediton
and debtor countries are placell ii- j-w• z T•w, _- interested watcher of the
.a.t sw would begin
to understand why progras cw .tek g 1Udiuns is often
very slow. Notwithstanding
& ·r.eit interests of
creditors, they appeared to Jigiay lllls CDallOll perception
of the origins of the debt
•-,.ned .-ljustments
expected from debtors and tlaal ,...._ ._. often contributed to tough debt negotiatiom.. •
SJ die creditors attributed the origins of the debt c:rilisll•nilYtopoor economic
management in the debtor «--wics 1ky' often alleged
that contracted loans were __... lly iw:fficient public
enterprises, while overregulatioa &i _. poride the fnomable environment for orderly
• growth of the
indebted countries. The mainlbaa a6 aalit01s has insisted
that debtor countries should pay d •lir 411:Ms fully to awid a
threat to the international
ie1 systan. They also
believe that debt relief to debtors Jllligk naa illlllt tllan more
since this might cut them off fm r...c ....... fiQB
the world financial markets which __.. lliwllir 11111:ir economic prospects. On the contrary,..._
: its mually
downplay the poor management of d •lir ••
·es • a
major factor in the emeigence of the dcbt ailil,_._. they
emphasise the rise in world interest DIiks. die llediae in
commodity prices and the collapse of wadi tDie wllidl
became prominent in the early 1980s • die - •- c:matributory factors. Furthermore, debtor countries aim attribute
the emergence of economic shocks to the JWl'OeCOllOffli
policies of creditor COIDltries, especially the U.SA
However, between I 982 when the debt crisis surfaced
and now, considerable progress has been made to bridge
the gap between the two sides. On the part of the crectiton>
there has been a gradual awareness that the precarious
position of the debtor countries could only be adjusted
at a slow pace mainly because of the difficulties facing
adjustment programmes in these countries. In addition,
the creditors, particularly the commercial banks, have
become sensitive to the adverse effects of the debt problems
on their balance sheets. The debtor countries, on the other
hand, have realised that continuation of previous defective

The Multilateral illltitutiona such as the IMF, the World
Bank and UNCTAD constitute a special group of creditors.
They combine their traditional roles of ensuring an orderly
and stable international economic system with that of providing credit to needy member countries. In addition, they
also play intermediary roles in the debt crisis and management although a good number of observers consider them as
working mainly in the interest of the creditors. On the
whole, these institutions perceive their intermediary roles as
fostering the orderly development of the international
financial system and encouraging faster growth of the world
economy.
In pursuit of its central role of assisting member countries
with balance of payments problems and promoting orderly
exchange arrangements, the IMF perceives the debt problems
of member countries which emerge from balance of payments problems as disruptive of the development of the
international financial system and so attempts to cooperate
with members to minimise such constraints. In its annual
consultations with member countries, the IMF usually
reviews the economic and financial situation and the prospects and renders appropriate advice especially on steps to
avoid serious debt problems. For member countries that are
in serious debt problems and decide to reschedule their
debts, the IMF renders a lot of technical assistance involving
the collection of data, analysis of their current economic
situation and the prospects. As stated earlier, such countries
must have stabilization programmes with the Fund and these
usually demand wide consultations and cooperation.
The World Bank on its part is concerned mainly with
long-term .growth and reduction of poverty. Thus, the Bank
is primarily concerned with the long-term implications of
external debt problems for both the growth of the countries
involved and the world economy as a whole. The Bank's
main strategy is to assist members to return to stable growth
and credit-worthiness. With its large loan portfolio to members, the Bank is also concerned with the ability of debtor
countries to repay its loans which will in turn enhance its
own ability to recycle resources. The Bank's assistance
strategy in the external debt crisis has been succintly describe'1 by Bock (I 988). Firstly, the Bank has given increased
support for structural adjustment programmes mainly
in the form of fast-disbursing policy-based operations.
Secondly, it has intensified policy dialogue with a view to
identifying relevant structural changes and the policy reforms
needed. Thirdly, it has sustained investment financing
with emphasis on rehabilitating and restructuring projects,
enterprises, investment programmes and expanding productive capacity. Fourthly, it has sustained efforts to reduce
poverty particularly by minimising the adverse impact
of external debt burden and the adjustment process on the
low-income groups. Finally, it has assisted in mobilizing
support for commercial and official lenders.
The debtors are mainly from the developing countries
which can be grouped into two according to the nature and
severity of their debt crisis. The major group comprises
the co-called highly-indebted countries (HICs) as identified
under the original Baker Plan, as well as two other countries.
The seventeen HICs consist of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Cote d'Ivoire, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
Costa Rica and Jamaica. The debts of these countries are
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per cent in 1984 and 1985, respectively. But as the trade
arrears were refinanced under the rescheduling arrangements,
the share of short term debt in the debt profile declined
to only 12.9 per cent in 1988. Consequently, the massive
pressure usually produced on a country immersed in shortterm debt have been minimised since 1987.
As shown in Table 1, Nigeria's total external debt outstanding has grown astronomically since 1978. Before then,
the debt outstanding grew very moderately. Between 1971
and 1977, for instance, total external debt outstanding
increased on the average by 15 .4 per cent per annum, moving
from a level of only N214.5 million in 1971 to M496.9
million in 1977. The first bigjump occurred in 1978 following the two Jumbo loans amounting to nearly N2 .0 billion,
resulting .in an increase of 154.7 per cent in total debt
outstanding to Nl ,265 .7 million in that year compared with
the annual average of only N328.4 million between 1971
and 1977. The next dramatic change took place in 1982
when total debt outstanding increased by 278.3 per cent to
N8 ,819 .4 million. In fact, this 11tarked the beginning of the
international economic and debt crisis. Total external debt
outstanding increased by 139 .7 and 143 .1 per cent in 1986
and 1987 respectively, which was largely the consequence of
the Structural Adjustment Programme which witnessed a
continuous depreciation of the naira exchange rate and
greater documentation of previous debts. On the whole,
the total external debt outstanding increased at an average of
81.2 per cent per annum between 1978 and 1988, a growth
rate that was five times that of the period 1971 - 1977.
Despite the rapid growth in Nigeria's total external debt
outstanding in the review period, it is still relevant to ascertain
whether the absolute level of external debt was a source of
great concern. In other words, how grave was the external
debt problem? Here again, we face a technical problem
because there is no standard measurement of whether a
particular level of external debt is too high or is acceptable.
The judgement, apart from being a little arbitrary, has to be
made in the context of a country's economic position. The
commonly used external debt indicators are presented in
Table 2 for the period 1971 - 1988. The six indicators
computed show clearly that Nigeria's external debt problem
deteriorated rapidly in the early 1980s and can currently
be described as serious and disturbing. The first indicator
is the Debt/GDP ratio which measures that portion of
national output that is potentially due to foreign economic
agents. This ratio rose from under 2 per cent a year between
1971 and 1977 to 14 .9 per cent in 1983, 21.9 per cent in
1985 and 97 .8 pei: cent in 1988. If in 1988 foreign creditors
wanted all their money, we would, if possible, have sold or
exchanged all but 2.2 per cent of what we produced for
settlement. This is by any standard a serious situation. The
second ratio is the Debt/Exports ratio which measures how
much of our export earnings can be used to liquidate the
total debt outstanding. This ratio moved from an average
of 7 .6 per cent in 1971 - 1977 to 101.1 per cent in 1982
and 404.2 per cent in 1988. In other words, if we exported
goods and services at the level we did in 1988, we would
spend at least four years before the total debt could be liquidated. Where a debt significantly circumscribes current and
future actions, it is clearly serious. Thirdly, there is the
popular Debt Service ratio which measures the proportion

policies would only exacerbate their debt problems and have
adopted adjustment programmes with varying degrees of
pain and political risks. The result of the emerging consensus
has tended to favour the modest achievement of individual
goals in the debt crisis.
II.

fflE PROFILE OF NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL DEBT

PROBLEM
An objective appraisal of Nigeria's current and future
approaches to her external debt problem must be predicated
on a sufficient knowledge of its size, structure, trends and
determinants, as well as the economic implications of these
variables. However, such desirable economic analysis could
be constrained by the deficient data base which is glaringly
reflected in the published data of Nigeria's external debt
in many sources. The analysis in this section is based largely
on Nigerian official external debt data as periodically published by the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development and the Central Bank of Nigeria. But where
international comparisons are made, external debt data
published by the World Bank are cited. It should be stated
that the differences in the published data of Nigeria's external
debt do not significantly alter the structure, trends and their
impact during the period reviewed in the analysis.
The structure of Nigeria's external debt had changed
significantly since the late 1970s. A breakdown of total
external debt by source shows that over 90 per cent of total
debt outstanding between 1971 and 1977 was on the average
made up of official debt from bilateral and multilateral
agencies (see Table 1). But starting from 1978 when Nigeria
began to borrow from the international private capital
markets, the magnitude of official debt has substantially
declined while borrowing from private sources has increased
tremendously. While the share of total debt outstanding
from official sources moved from an average of 91.4 per cent
between 1971 and 1977 to 33 .3 per cent in 1978 - 1980
and 13.8 per cent in 1981 -1987, that of private agencies
moved from a negligible proportion in 1971 - 1977 to 57 .6
per cent in 1978 - 1980 and 82 .0 per cent in 1981 - 1987.
The structure of the debt owed to private sources has itself
changed since 1982 with the emergence of ttle trade arrears.
Before 1982, private borrowing came solely from the international capital market, whereas trade arrears (refinanced
and unrefinanced) had since then constituted a significant
proportion of debt to private agencies. As of 1988, the
bulk of Nigeria's total external debt outstanding amounting
to 85 .7 per cent was owed to private sources, while only
10 per cent was accounted for by official sources. The
implication of this lopsided ~tructure is that Nigeria's debt
burden has increased over time since borrowing from private
sources is usually on stiffer terms with regard to the maturity
and interest rate, whereas borrowing from official sources
is generally at concessional terms. The structure of the
external debt by source could largely determine the term
structure which is also a good indicator of the debt burden.
Up to 1981, the total debt outstanding was made up wholly
of medium/long-term loans maturing from three years and
above. Again due to the emergence of the trade arrears which
are short term debt unless refinanced, the share of short-term
debt climbed from 22 .5 per cent in 1982 to 37 .4 and 35
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and negligible growth which make the debt burden disturbing.

of export earnings that is used to service the external debt in
terms of principal repayment and inter-est. lbis is a more
realistic measure because debt normally matures over an
extended period. The ratio moved from an average of only
0.7 per cent in 1971 - 1977 to 8.8 per cent in 1982, 31.7
per cent in 1985 and 24.2 per cent in 1988. Thus, over the
period, more and more of export earnings were used to
service debt, leaving a lower proportion for other uses. The
ratio in 1986 and 1988 was understated because of the
non-payment of a portion of debt service due. In actual fact,
the debt service ratio between 1986 and 1988 could have
averaged 36.1 per cent as against the 21.4 per cent recorded.
That position was also uncomfortable. The fourth ratio
is interest/Exports ratio which measures the proportion
of export earnings used to pay interest on debt. The ratio
increased gradually from an average of O.4 per cent in 1971
- 1977 to 5 .2 and 15 .5 per cent in 1982 and 1988, respectively. Thus, if the principal was not repaid but refinanced and
rolled over, an increasing portion of our export earnings
would have been devoted to interest payment. The fifth
ratio is the Reserves/Debt ratio which measures the extent
to which the nation's external reserves cover the external
debt. The ratio declined from the comfortable average level
of 588 .1 per cent in 1971 - 1977 to 11.6 per cent in 1982
and only 2 .4 per cent in 1988. Thus, while Nigeria had
external reserve levels that were multiples of the debt outstanding before 1978, the position deteriorated seriously
from 1982 when the external reserve levels could only cover
an insignificant portion of total debt. Finally, the Reserves/
Imports ratio, which computes the number of months'
imports the external reserves could cover, indicates the
level of pressures on the external sector which could be
linked with escalating debt problems. While in 1971 - 1977,
Nigeria's external reserves could cover eight months of
imports at any time, the period of cover was reduced to less
than 2 months in 1988. A large part of export earnings was
being used to service external debt and since exports had
declined drastically, external reserves were precariously
depleted.
Since Nigeria's external debt problem caught the attention
of the international financial community in the last few
years, an additional approach to evaluating the problem is to
consider it in relation to the global problem especially in the
context of the developing countries. For Nigeria, this could
be examined from the angles of all the developing countries,
Sub-Saharan Africa and the highly-indebted countries (HICs).
As gauged by the level of debt outstanding at the end of
1988, Nigeria was more externally indebted than the average
developing country. Nigeria's total external debt outstanding
of about US ~0.5 billion in 1988 accounted for 2.3 per cent
of the total debt outstanding of all the developing countries
as a group. However, based .on per capita income levels,
Nigeria would be in the upper segment of the group of
developing countries. Similarly, Nigeria's debt outstanding
was significantly higher than that of the average country
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria, in fact, has the largest debt
outstanding in the region. But Nigeria's economic situation,
particularly the potential for growth makes her debt status
more bearable than the Sub-group of Low-Income Africa
within Sub-Saharan Africa. In this sub-group, export earnings
have tended to decline in the midst of falling living standards

Nigeria's external debt problem should be properly considered within the HICs among which it is classified. As of
1988, Nigeria had the fifth largest debt outstanding in this
group and was exceeded only by debt levels in Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina and Venezuela in that order (See Table 3). But,
whereas Nigeria accounted for only 5 .8 per cent of total debt
outstanding among the HICs in 1988, the largest four indebted countries accounted for an average of 15 .2 per cent
of debt outstanding in the HICs. Indeed, Nigeria's share of
debt in this group could be considered small when compared
with those of Brazil (22.7%), Mexico (20.3%) and Argentina
(11.3%). Perhaps what makes Nigeria's external debt problem
significant within the group is its poor economic performance
since 1982. In the period 1982 - 1988, average growth rate
of GDP in the group was 2.6 per cent while Nigeria's GDP
fell by an average of 0.3 per cent a year. Total exports grew
by 2 .1 per cent a year in Nigeria, while it grew by 2 .9 per
cent in the group. Total imports declined by 20.6 per cent
a year in Nigeria while it recorded a fall of only 3 .4 per cent
in the group. These trends have affected growth in investment and per capita consumption more adversely in Nigeria
than in the group.
For completeness of the overview of the nature and extent of Nigeria's external debt, it is relevant to review the
causes and consequences for the economy. The causes and
origins of the external debt problem have been traced to external and domestic economic factors, although there can be
no perfect distinction between the two groups of factors
(Wiesner, 1985 and Sanusi, 1988). The two most prominent
external factors were the liberal lending behaviour of the
international commercial banks of which Nigeria was a major
victim and the immediate environment of 1982. The rapid
world economic growth of the 1970s combined with low
interest rates and high export growth, as well as the belief
that "countries never go bankrupt", prompted the banks
to increase their lending particularly as a lot of the resources of the oil boom had to be recycled without the
least concern for the risk of such actions. There appeared
at the time to be less concern for the quality of economic
management and the ability of debtor countries to generate
repayment resources from internal sources rather than
from new loans. Of course, the behaviour of the lending
banks could only have been complemented by the inappropriate actions in domestic economies. This was critical in
the Nigerian situation. Subsequent adverse world economic
developments like the rise in interest rates, and the world
recession only helped to accelerate the emergence of more
serious debt crisis rather than originate it. Ultimately, the
fundamental causes of the Nigerian external debt crisis
must be traced to the domestic economy. Even in a situation where an external economic development could be a
critical factor in the domestic economy, there should be an
adjustment to the external shock. Looking through the
management of the Nigerian economy from the early 1970s,
there was no evidence of domestic adjustment to observed
developments. In the first place, the factor of over-dependence on petroleum as the main source of export earnings
was maintained for too long without any adjustment reaction. Worse still, there was no relevant adjustment to the
oil boom sparked off by developments in 1973/74 and
49

1978/80. Economic management tended to favour rapid
expansion whose sustainability was never questioned critically. This strategy resulted in a high level of external
debt which could not be supported by the rapid downturn
in the early 1980s. Inappropriate fiscal, monetary and
external debt policies were the main elements of the poor
domestic economic management which escalated the
Nigerian external debt problem. The expansionary fiscal;
monetary as well as inappropriate exchange rate and pricing
policies which were pursued during the period resulted in
various forms of econ9mic distortions like domestic inflation, over-valuation of the exchange rate, capital flight,
wrong alignment of relative prices, excessive importation
and lack of incentives to produce for export all of which
tended to reduce the domestic capacity to service the rising
levels of external borrowing. These rising levels of external
borrowing a lot of which consisted of short/ medium term
loans with amortization falling due before project completion, were not always judiciously applied. Not only did many
government agencies borrow indiscriminately from abroad,
but also the use of the loans was not adequately monitored.
The consequence of this faulty external debt policy was the
lack of regular income to service disbursed external loans.
That the period of external debt crisis in Nigeria has
been associated with little or no economic growth is very
clear. It is probably correct to state that the source of
growth stagnation could be traced to the period of economic distortions of the 1970s. But once the debt crisis reached
a climax, it helped to exacerbate the deteriorating economic
situation. This happened in the Nigerian situation because
of the adverse effect of the debt burden on the external
sector and inflation both of which could potentially retard
growth. As debt service payments significantly exceeded
capital inflow, there was a shortfall in the resources for
domestic investment. Put in another way, increased debt
burden in the Nigerian context was partly transmitted into
balance of payments problems which were generally stemmed by a drastic reduction in imports. As has been clearly
obvious, the fall in the importation of capital goods and
raw materials has reduced the tempo of implementation
and initiation of various development projects. This process
has also resulted in slow growth in domestic output especially in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors.
The inadequate growth in the volume of domestic ·goods
and services has also generated a lot of inflationary pressures
which stunted growth further and prevented planning for
increased output. By the same token, the external debt
problem could be linked with the serious unemployment
· problem in the country. Even the protracted negotiations
to reschedule and restructure external debt obligations
could be wasteful of vital human resources which could have
been utilised for directly productive activities.
Ill.

to ameliorate the debt problem. Firstly, there was the possibility of repudiating 'l)art or all of the debt. Debt repudiation
is a unilateral action involving a refusal to settle due obligations. This is not a viable option for Nigeria even if undertaken within a group action. Nigeria has generally not adopted such extremely radical approach to international economic issues. Debt repudiation is obviously a calculated risk
implying that a country undertaking it would find it extremely difficult to interact with the rest of the world economy
because of the large influence of the industrialised countries
which are mainly the creditors. Retaliation by these countries which could involve the seizure of Nigeria's external
assets is most likely to increase short-run economic problems,
while any further reaction from debtors could not be sustained. Secondly, Nigeria could have benefitted from debt
cancellation by creditors. In fact, this is another extreme
position opposite to debt repudiation. This is not also a
natural occurrence in the case of Nigeria. Apart from the
fact that creditors have usually frowned at such suggestion,
it may also limit or cut off capital flow to the beneficiary
in future because of the in-built risk of such flows. Partial
debt cancellation has been done to favour the low-income
countries in sub-saharan .Africa. But Nigeria is classified as
a middle-income country and except for her current economic problems which are regarded as temporary she is generally regarded potentially capable to pay her external debt
obligations. However, Nigeria has recently enjoyed some
debt cancellation by a few creditors, but this is such a
negligible proportion of total debt outstanding. Thirdly,
Nigeria might attempt to pay in full all debt obligations
as they fall due. In the absence of recent debt management
strategies such as debt refinancing/rescheduling and the debt
conversion scheme, attempting to pay all debt obligations
due would have jeopardized Nigeria's growth prospects
especially as her total export earnings have not increased
significantly to reduce the adverse impact of such an approach. This conclusion is borne out by the principal "debt
indicators analysed in Part II. Fourthly, Nigeria could have
negotiated for debt relief and/or debt reduction. This option
would have resulted in lower debt service payments than
would have been possible without negotiations. In the event,
more of her foreign exchange earnings would be available
to service other sectors of the economy. This is the option
which Nigeria has pursued vigorously in the last five years.
On the whole, Nigeria has so far used four main instruments of debt relief and reduction. Two of these could be
disposed off quickly. The first was the embargo placed on
external borrowing since the early 1980s except in cases
where it is absolutely necessary or it is specifically tied to
a project whose viability can be reasonably guaranteed. In
fact, the Federal Government had taken specific steps to
bring order to the external borrowing process in the public
sector, especially by the state governments and government
parastatals. The second was the limit placed on debt service
payments. In the 1986 Budget, the Federal Government
had pegged the debt service buraen for 1986 at a level not
exceeding 30 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. However, this was not supposed to be a unilateral moratorium.
on debt service payments but a target thought to be feasible
under the current loan rescheduling and other negotiatious
with the external creditors. However, in terms of viability,

NIGERIA'S CURRENT EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIBS

The analysis of Nigeria's external debt profile undertaken
in Part II shows clearly that Nigeria currently has a huge debt
burden which could disrupt economic growth and stability.
At any point since the debt crisis emerged, Nigeria could
have adopted any or a combination of at least four options
50

1986 and 1987 valued at $2.4 billion were rescheduled for
repayment between 1987 and 1990 with a grace period of
one year with interest payment at a rate of 1¾ per cent
above UBOR. Under the aegis of the Paris Club of official
creditors, agreement was reached to reschedule a total of
$6.3 billion which was principal and interest due between
October 1986 and December 1987. Other short term claims
up to December 1983 were also to be covered by the agreement. Terms were to be negotiated bilaterally.
In 1988, another round of rescheduling involving $5.9
billion being claims of the London Club took place. The
amount consisted of $2.5 billion letters of credit arrears
originally rescheduled for 4 years under the 1987 agreement,
$600 million representing interest charges and commission
payable on letters of Credit, $1.7 billion medium/long term
debt originally rescheduled in 1987, as well as new maturities for 1988 amounting to $1.2 billion. While the letters
of credit were made repayable over 12 years, the conventional loans were to be repaid in 20 years with 3 years of
grace.
Rescheduling agreements with the London Club for 1989
were signed in March and made oeerational from June 14.
The agreements provided for (i) repayment between 1989
and 1991 of payable debt of $500 million (ii) repayment
between 1992 and 2003 of refinanced letters of credits of
$2.4 billion (iii) repayment between 1992 and 2008 of
medium/long term debt amounting to $2.8 billion (iv) interest rates of 13/16 and 7/8 per cent above LIBOR on
refinancing and restructuring amendment agreements,
respectively, while payable debt is non-interest bearing if
there is no default (v) a menu of options to provide further
relief such as the conversion of payable debt into interest
bearing Naira denominated securities with a coupon rate of
13¼ per cent and maturity of 18 months, conversion of
other bank debts into a Nigerian Investment Bond with a
grace period of 10 years, a repayment period also of 10
years, and interest of 6 per cent flat; and amendment of
Guidelines on Debt Conversion to make bank debt eligible
for conversion under the programme.
The agreement with the Paris Club for 1989 (signed
early in March) provided for: (i) rescheduling of 60 per cent
of arrears of short term trade debts due on December 31
1990 (ii) rescheduling of all post September 1986 maturities amounting to $110.03 million for repayment between
June 30, 1989 and December 31, 1994 (iii) rescheduling of
all ai:rears of medium/long term maturities for repayment
between February 28, 1995 and August 31, 1999 (iv) completion of all bilateral agreements before September 30,
1989.
With the favourable terms and concessions Nigeria won
from the debt refmancing/rescheduling efforts, short term
relief from severe debt burden has been secured and this
has enabled the thin foreign exchange resources. to be spread
over other essential areas. However, there are certain fundamental factors which make the exercise at best a temporary
rather than a long term solution to the external debt problem. First of all, there is the fact that the exercise does
not reduce the debt but pushes it to the future at higher
cost because of the tendency for interest rates to rise.
Secondly, the restructuring programme has not earned the
52-called "new money" packages. Creditors are eager to

the two major instruments of external debt management are
debt refinancing/rescheduling with debt conversion which
are examined in detail below.

Debt Ref"Ullllcing/Rescheduling
Debt refinancing involves a new medium-term loan in
the amount of the debt that is due which is now repaid with
the proceeds of the new loan, while debt rescheduling
involves a rearrangement of the repayment terms of an
original loan. A rescheduling usually covers repayments
(principal or principal and interest) falling due in a particular
period, usually one year. The rescheduling exercise does not
only postpone the debt repayment, but spreads it over a
number of years with an initial period of grace. The debtor
country will however continue to pay interest on the debt
outstanding until fully repaid. Debt refinancing/rescheduling
becomes necessary when a country faces a temporary foreign
exchange constraint or a fundamental economic imbalance.
In the former case, the rescheduled debt will give the debtor
country some breathing space during which the temporary
balance of payments problem could be eliminated. In the
latter situation, debt rescheduling reduces the debtor's
debt burden and gives room for proper adjustment to be
undertaken to redress the basic balance of payments disequilibrium. This has been the basis for requiring debtor
countries requesting for debt negotiations to adopt adjustment programmes supported by the IMF. Most rescheduling
exercises are undertaken multilaterally in the first instance
with the Paris and London Clubs, and thereafter bilaterally
between individual creditors and debtors.
The refinancing/rescheduling programme for Nigeria's
external debt was first implemented in 1983. In July and
September 198 3, refinancing agreements on confirmed
letters of credit, amounting to $2,112.0 million were reached
and these involved a repayment for three years including
a grace period of six months at an interest rate of 1¼ per
cent above LIBOR. These claims were fully repaid in 1986.
Following this successful exercise, agreements were reached
to refinance trade arrears arising from bills for collection,
open account transactions and unconfirmed letters of credit
by the issuance of promissory note of six-year maturity,
with a grace period 2½ years. The total value of notes issued
was $3,834.4 million at an interest rate of 1.0 per cent
above LIBOR while the redemption was to begin in October
1986 on a quarterly basis. However, because Nigeria was
unable to redeem the notes on due dates, the principal
was refinanced while the interest due was capitalised. The
principal and interest capitalised amounted to $4.8 billion
which was rescheduled in January 1988 over a repayment
period of 2 2 years including a grace period of two years.
Promissory notes worth $841.2 million were verified and
accepted in respect of the insured creditors, but no refmancing agreement was reached. However, they accepted the
payment of interest on such claims.
Efforts to reschedule debts under the auspices of the
London and Paris Clubs have been geared up since 1986.
In 1987, rescheduling involving medium/long term debt
amounting to $1 .6 billion falling due to the London Club
for 1986 and 1987 was undertaken and it involved repayment over the period 1986 - 1996 with a grace period of 4
years. Under the same agreement, letters of credit due in
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the secondary market. Their greatest incentive for doing
this is the discount they can obtain on such debt purchase
which when redeemed earns them larger amounts of local
currency at the prevailing exchange rate. However, such
inventives can be discounted by a possible restriction on
future repatriation of profit and capital and enterprises
in which such investment can be undertaken. For many
companies, the terms under the debt-equity swaps appear
more direct and realisable than in regular direct foreign
investment transactions. The debtor countries of course
favour the debt-equity swaps because they not only reduce the levels of favourable environment for economic
growth.
From the point of view of all the participants, debtequity swaps are worthwhile. Looking at them from the
specific angle of a debtor country, it has the following
advantages. Firstly, it reduces the level of their external
debt without undergoing the strains which would have been
the case if the debtor country were to obtain the physical
foreign currency for repayment. Closely linked with this
advantage is that the reduced debt service payment put the
debtor country in a better economic position which may
enhance its ability to attract new money for new development projects. Secondly, if the new inflow of foreign investment is properly directed, the results could be favourable for the expansion of export industries which can further enhance future capability to service the remaining
external debt. Thirdly, increased flow of foreign investment
will likely be accompanied by new technologies. Fourthly, debt conversion has provided incentives for the repatriation of flight capital, particularly foreign exchange held
abroad by the nationals of the debtor country involved.
Fifthly, debt conversion is usually made to generate revenue
for the government at the time of transaction while future
profitable investments from the transaction can be taxed
by the government. All these advantages can generally be
equated to an increased level of economic activities and
employment opportunities arising from debt-conversion.
But whether the advantages will be reaped by a particular
country depends on the nature and implementation of
its debt conversion programme.
The mechanism of a debt conversion transaction is very
simple. If an international company is interested in investing
in Nigeria which is operating a debt conversion scheme to
reduce its debt, it can approach a bank that holds Nigeria's
debt paper or go into the secondary market directly to
purchase Nigeria's debt at a discount. Before Nigeria set
up the debt conversion scheme, the promissory notes issued
by her on account of short term debts were selling at discounts of 66 - 72 per cent. This meant that a dollar of the
promissory note was being traded for 28 - 34 cents. If
the international company obtains a discount of 70 per
cent, it would pay $30 for the $100 promissory note it is
purchasing. The $100 note is now presented to the Central
Bank of Nigeria which will redeem it in local currency
under its debt conversion programme. The Central Bank
of Nigeria may not pay the face value of this note, but it
will certainly be higher than the secondary market value.
If CBN discounts it at 10 per cent, the international company will obtain the equivalent of $90 in local currency
at the current exchange rate to finance its local investment
as stipulated by CBN. If the current exchange rate is $1.00 =

recover the debts but not to lend new money a development which has resulted in debtor countries like Nigeria
experiencing net capital outflows which obviously constrain the implementation of adjustment programmes.
Thirdly, the refinancing/rescheduling negotiations become so
complex, protracted and costly to the debtor. This is partly
because the negotiations are initially carried out with a group
of creditors before bilateral agreements are entered into,
particularly under the Paris Club rescheduling programme.
In addition, negotiations become necessary almost continuously because of the inability of debtors to comply with
repayment schedules. For these reasons, Nigeria started to
explore other debt relief and reduction strategies alongside
the refinancing and rescheduling negotiations. Debt conversion became the obvious candidate.

Debt Conversion:
(a) The Concept
Debt conversion has emerged in recent years as a potent
instrument of debt reduction which could in a way substitute for new money because it promotes new domestic
investment which is a vital aspect of the adjustment process.
Debt conversion simply involves the exchange of a debtor
country's external debt for a domestic debt in local currency
or equity participation in a local development project. Since
this technique emerged, several types have been applied.
The most common is debt for equity conversion which
involves the exchange of a country's external debt denominated in foreign currency for local currency which may be
utilised to set up new enterprises or purchase equity shares
in existing enterprises which have been designated for that
purpose. There could also be a debt for debt conversion
which is an exchange of the external debt for domestic
debt which may be sold for cash in the secondary market.
Thirdly, there is debt for cash conversion which entails the
exchange of external debt for local currency which can be
used for local working capital, loan repayments and local
tax payments. Fourthly, there is debt for exports conversion which is an exchange of a country's exports for cash
in foreign currency and part of its exte.mal debt. Finally,
there is debt for nature conversion which involves the exchange of external debt for local currency which can be used
to finance projects which are designed to conserve the
environment.
Most debt conversion exercises involve three groups of
participants as well as the existence of a secondary financial
market. For example, in a typical debt-equity swap, the main
participants are the banks, the investors and the debtor
countries all bound together by the debtor country's indebtedness and a secondary market where external debt is
traded at a discount. The banks hold the external debt
papers which they may wish to get rid of to strengthen
their financial position through, for instance, eliminating
bad loans, reduce their current credit exposure as a means
of avoiding future involvement in risky credit exposure,
as well as out of sheer preference sell the discounted debt
paper whose proceeds can be reinvested rather than hold
it when its repayment prospects are uncertain. The investors
are those companies which want to invest in the indebted
countries through the purchase of their external debt in
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loans, indicating that these loans are actually worth less
than their nominal values and therefore a possibility that
they could in future sell more loan papers which could be
converted. Thirdly, debt conversion schemes could be
constrained by complex issues of the sovereignty of the
countries wishing to undertake debt conversion exercises.
The general public become rather emotional about foreign
domination which is a possibility in such a policy measure.
However, a country cannot simply adopt a debt conversion
programme as a desperate action. It should be properly
planned and made consistent with current domestic policies.
To this end, the rules and regulations as spelt out in the
guidelines on DCP in Nigeria stipulate the eligible foreign
debt for conversion, transaction categories, participants
and income remittance.
Fourthly, the debt conversion process could be counterproductive to current monetary and fiscal policies which
normally requires a lot of caution to be taken in implementing the programme. For instance, in debt-equity swaps, the
possibility of rapid monetary expansion could be a source of
inflationary pressures. This is because the financing of the
conversion transaction through the banking system particularly in Central Bank results in a corresponding increase in
money supply which could worsen the inflationary pressure
in the short run. There is also the possibility that the transactions could over a period increase interest rates which
could be a source of increased production costs and prices.
The magnitude of these effects would also depend on the size
of the financial markets which are typically narrow in the
developing countries. Consequently, the likely effect of debt
conversion on monetary aggregates and the macroeconomy
would place a serious limit on the volume of debt conversion
that can be embarked upon in a given period. The Nigerian
DCP has taken precautions against these possible occurrencies
by ensuring that the volume of debt conversion is within the
permissible monetary and credit targets, as well as directing
equity or new investment into the directly productive sectors.
In fact, the implementation ensures that fund release for the
execution of projects is phased out to minimise the short
run impact on the price level. The long-run effect would be
positive as long as such investments are profitable.

~7 .00, the international company obtains from the CBN
~630.00, which is substantially higher than the )li210 which
it would have obtained from its initial expenditure of $30
assuming there was no debt conversion transaction.
(b)

Nigeria's Debt Conversion Programme

In February 1988, Nigeria established a Debt Conversion
Committee (DCC) to prepare a Debt Conversion Programme
(DCP) to enable her derive some of the benefits of debt
conversion outlined above, i.e., external debt reduction to
alleviate the debt burden, stimulation of foreign investment
inflow, encourage repatriation of flight capital and to promote exports. The Debt Conversion Programme (DCP)
was formally initiated in July 1988 when the guidelines for
its implemention were issued. As of June 1989, a year after
its inauguration, considerable interest has been shown
in the programme which demonstrates that it could be a
viable means of debt reduction and it also reflects a lot of
confidence in the Nigerian economy. During the period, a
total of 135 applications amounting to $438.9 million
were received for conversion. In the 6 auctions conducted,
51 applicants were fully successful while 3 were partially
successful. Total amount redeemed was $160.7 million while
the discounted value was $88.6 million indicating an average
discount of 44.8 per cent. The discounted redeemed value
in Naira was N569 .0 million implying an average exchange
rate of $1.00 = N6.42 l. The bulk of debt converted has been
earmarked for agricultural and manufacturing projects. Out
of the 54 successful applications, the shares of manufacturing
and agro-allied sectors were 48.1 and 40.7 per cent respectively while the remaining applications were on account of
hotel and tourism, exploration and mining and cash gifts
and grants. Similarly, manufacturing and agro-allied enterprises took 49.6 and 35.5 per cent, respectively of the
total naira value of converted debt, while the other three
sectors shared the balance of 14.9 per cent.
Much as debt conversion is a usefut means of debt reduction, there are several constraints which ultimately make it
less effective than is expected. Firstly, the pace of implementation could slow down after the initial impetus because
further progress comes to be related with critical issues
like the progress of adjustment in the country involved, its
economic prospects generally and the investment climate in
particular. For a country that has not been able to attract
enough foreign investment in normal circumstances in the
past, it is extremely tough to reverse the situation so quickly
by debt conversion incentives. The large potential of the
Nigerian economy and the fairly successful implementation
of the structural adjustment policies since 1986 could make
an expanded scope of the debt conversion programme more
relevant in the future. Secondly, there has been a reluctance
on the part of some creditors to drop the debt assets from
their balance sheets and absorb the loss largely due to legal
constraints. In the US for instance, there is the likelihood
that creditors that wish to sell their loan papers at a discount
in the secondary market may be required to apply the
same rule to adjust the value of similar assets remaining in
their portfolios. This legal constraint could be removed
gradually since many creditors especially in the US have
begun to set aside reserves against their problem international

IV.

O111ER APPROACHES TO EXTERNAL DEBT
REDUCTION

Sir,ce the international debt crisis became pronounced
in 1982, approaches to resolving the crisis have moved from a
set of what could be called the traditional types to the
current ones which emphasbe the choice from a "menu" of
options. There has also been an avalanche of proposals which
underpin the interrelationship of all the economies suggesting
that if the international debt crisis is not resolved, the
international economy would suffer in contrast to the belief
that the debt problem is an issue between the creditors and
the debtors. We shall briefly review the possibilities and prospects of these new approaches in the following subsections.

The Traditonal Instruments
The traditonal instruments of external debt management
could be said to have aimed mainly at providing relief to
the indebted country particularly where the burden of debt.
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lenders. Under the Paris Club reschedulings, such a technique
would involve exemption of banks with exposure below a
specified amount of requests to participate in new money
packages. Another variant permits creditor banks to reduce
their base exposure for calculating new money contributions
by up to the same specified limit. The exit bonds as worked
out in the Argentine case in 1987 have a fixed low interest
rate and a long maturity. Finally, debt buy-back is a technique which allows debtor countries to repurchase a portion
of their debt at a discount, while the remaining debt will
be restructured. In the Bolivian case the buy-back operation
would be negotiated between it and the creditors without
resort to the secondary market and foreign exchange obtained from donor governments would be used to effect the
transaction.

like in Nigeria's case was very heavy. This was the basis of
the rescheduling/refinancing agreements discussed earlier.
Under such agreements, various techniques could be applied.
For instance in the Nigerian case, the techniques of currency
denomination and interest rate options were applied. Essentially currency redenomination could allow a debtor country
to diversify the currency of its debt to other currencies
with lower interest rates which could reduce debt service
payments. The interest rate option allows the use of an
interest base such as LIBOR to which a spread is added. This
may lower financing and intermediation costs as well as
reduce the risks of future increases in market interest rates.
Other traditional techniques of debt management include
interest retiming, onlending and relending, new trade credit
facilities, cofinancing ahd debt conversion. Except for the
debt conversion described earlier, Nigeria has not made use
of these techniques. Interest retiming implies an extension
of the interval between interest payments which permits a
debtor country to postpone one or more interest payments.
On lending permits the proceeds of a new loan to be transferred to a new debtor who then assumes the repayment by
the original borrower, while relending involves lending repaid
proceeds of an outstanding debt to another borrower in the
same country. These two techniques usually involve a shift of
exposure from public to private sector which tends to reduce
the credit risks. The technique of new trade credit facility
also allows creditor banks to extend new money to private
sector agents for trade transactions. In cofinancing arrangements, creditor banks link their loans to lending from multilateral development institutions like the World Bank which
are usually responsible for project appraisal, supervision of
implementation and loan administration. The debt conversion which Nigeria is currently exploring is still limited in
scope and the potential for debt reduction could be extensive
in future. This is the more likely as the secondary market
transactions such as debt swaps among banks and outright
sales of debt expand.

A Cooperative Approach
In the international debate on the debt crisis, there is
a belief in the industrial countries which are mainly the
creditors that the debt crisis was brought about by the bad
economic policies in the indebted developing countries.
Correspondingly, there is a strong voice from the developing
countries and supported by objective analysts in the developed world that the root of the debt crisis can be traced to the
economic policies of the major industrial countries. However,
it is now accepted that the persistence of the debt crisis
is dangerous to the growth of the world economy. In fact,
since the debt crisis became more serious, many proposals of
a cooperative nature which recognise the interdependence
of world economies have been put forward. These proposals
form a unique set of approaches to the debt crisis and could
make a significant positive impact in the future. In this subsection, we shall consider among the numerous proposals,
the Baker and Brady Plans as well as the numerous ideas
on an international debt adjustment facility.
The US Government has been particularly active in
promoting some form of international debt settlement. The
first proposal was in 1985 by the US Treasury Secretary,
James Baker after whom the proposal was designated
as the Baker Plan. The Plan among others proposed that
private banks should be encouraged to commit a total of
$20 billion in net new lending over three years to support
comprehensive economic adjustment programmes. The
plan also envisagM that the 15 highly-indebted countries
(including Nigeria) identified under the programme would
receive an additional $9 billion net lending from the multilateral development banks in 1986-1988 in support of their
market-oriented policies. Countries that wanted to participate in the scheme would however undertake IMF-supported
structure adjustment programmes and implementation was to
continue to be on the basis of the case-by-case approach
to the debt problem. One fundamental assumption of the
Baker Plan was that if the debtor countries adopted growthoriented adjustment policies supported by new net lending
by the creditor banks and the multilateral agencies, the
rates of return on new lending would be so high to justify
such new lending. However the assumption became unrealistic as little or no new lending took place and even countries
that made positive achievements on their own were not
favoured by new resource transfers. The Baker Plan was
[enerally believed to be unrealistic because the new lending

The Menu Approach
The so-called "menu" approach simply expands the available options under rescheduling and new money agreements
as used traditionally, thus providing a lot of incentive for
both creditor banks and debtor countries. Out of the numerous new options, four can be briefly reviewed. The first
of these is securitization which involves the exchange of debt
for more tradable financial instruments, thereby allowing the
creditor banks to restructure their portfolios. Securitization
could be done by the issue of securities to refinance existing
debt, while creditor banks or their agents can also issue
securities backed by existing loans. Nigeria applied a limited
version of this technique in 1983 when the trade debt was
converted into promissory notes. Another new option
is interest capitalisation which is aimed at reducing interest
service directly by adding interest payments due to the
loan outstanding. The technique has been rarely used so far
because it is an extreme case in which postponement of
interest payment makes a lot of difference to a debtor
country. This is probably so in the case of low-income
countries. A third option is the alternative participation
instrument or more simply "exit bonds". This technique
was devised to rationalise contributions by big and small
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if the creditor banks concede to heavy Joan discounts.
The Brady Plan like its predecessor, the Baker Plan
has become more of a source of intellectual debate than
a concrete proposal to resolve the debt crisis.
Another model of co-operative settlement of the debt
crisis is the proposal for an international debt adjustment
facility. Many variants of this model have been proposed.
A proposal by Arjun Sengupta (1989) for instance seeks to
share the costs/benefits of debt adjustment among creditors, debtors, multilateral agencies and governments
through negotiations which take market quotations as a
guide. The discounts in the values of outstanding debts
provided by creditors wculd be passed on to debtors •as
much as possible after adopting policies agreed with the
IMF and in this way could experience in their economies
increased investment, growth and repayment prospects.
The creditor banlcs would accept in their books a loss which
the market has induced in their assets, but in the expectation
that the value of the remaining debt would increase. The
proposed facility would involve three simultaneous and
co-ordinated transactions. First, there would be a transaction
between the creditor banlcs and the IMF, by which the
facility would issue its own debt in exchange for a stipulated
amount of the debtor country's debt held by the creditor
institutions at a negotiated price provided the creditors
would also write off a negotiated amount of debt. Second,
there would be. a transaction between the facility and the
debtor country in which the discounts obtained from the
creditors would be passed to a debtor having been converted
into a new debt with the same repayment schedule of the
principal and interest as stipulated for the bonds issued
by the facility to the creditors. In this transaction, the
debtor country would of course be required to adopt an
IMF-supported policy package. Third, there would be a
transaction between, the creditors and debtor countries
by which the former would increase their lending to the
latter which would support increased growth of output and
exports in the debtor country consistent with a sustainable
level of resource transfer from the debtor country in fulfilment of its repayment obligations. Such lending would be
supplemented by that of the World Banlc. If the facility
works out as outlined above, the real cost is borne largely by
the IMF facility in the form of a contingent liability to pay
if the contracting debtor country fails to meet its payment
obligations to the facility. The proponent however believes
that this cost is worthwhile if ·there is an improvement
in the functioning of the international monetary system.
The main problem with the proposal for an IMF Debt
Facility typified by ,the Sengupta variant is that it shifts
the burden of co-operation to the IMF which may be considered acceptable. Ultimately, it will raise the issue of the
attitude of the developed countries which would be required
to contribute the bulk of the capital base for the facility and
this cannot be guaranteed to be totally favourable.

even if it materialised would have made no visible impact
because it was a small fraction of the interest payments
due during the period. But the plan did ensure that the
debtor countries would continue to render their obligations
once it was accepted that their economies must grow in order
to sustain their debt service capacity.
The Brady Plan so-named after Mr. Nicholas Brady, US
Treasury Secretary which came after lhe Baker Plan early
in 1989 contained two features of the latter in, first, maintaining the use of the case-by-case approach and second
in insisting that debt relief must be accompanied by economic reforms supervised by the IMF and World Banlc. But
the Brady Plan differs from the Baker Plan in accepting the
need for debt reduction without which credit worthiness
and economic recovery . would be impossible. Under the
plan, the various participants have specific obligations.
The creditor banlcs are to work with debtor countries to
provide a broader range of alternatives for financial support,
including greater efforts to achieve both debt and debt
service reduction and to provide new lending voluntarily.
The international financial institutions are expected to
continue to promote sound economic policies in debtor
countries, cofinance debt or debt service reduction and
offer additional financial support to collateralise a .portion
of interest payments.
Debtor countries would be obliged to pursue sound
economic policies · supported by the IMF, encourage the
return of flight capital which in many cases could be larger
than outstanding debt as well as implement viable debtequity swap programmes. On their part, the creditor governments are to continue to support the debtor countries
through more efforts to reschedule their exposure to them,
maintain export credits for debtor countries that follow
sound economic reforms, reduce regulatory, accounting
and tax constraints on debt reduction proposals, maintain sound ec~nomic policies, and open markets, as well
as to support both the IMF and the World Banlc to be in a
stronger financial position under the debt reduction plan.
The Brady Plan has indicated several ways to structure debtreduction transactions. One method is a cash buyback
by which the debtor country uses cash reserves (its own or
borrowed from the IMF or World Banlc) to repurchase some
of its debt from its creditor banlcs at a highly discounted
price. Another method is to undertake debt conversion
in which some of the outstanding debt is converted into a
new asset with a lower contractual debt service burden but
made less risky by guarantees or collaterals. A typical example of this is the debt-equity swap which was explained
earlier. The Brady Plan has been criticised mainly for relying on voluntary actions by creditor banlcs which have so
far not achieved much debt reduction. It has been suggested
that creditor banks could readily endorse the Brady Plan
on paper without mAking concrete concessions in practice.
.There are in fact no major incentives to get the creditor
banlcs to sell off the loans cheaply. As long as debts are
being serviced these banlcs are prepared to hold out. Moreover, since the Baker Plan was announced, many creditor
banlcs especially in the USA- have made provisions for bad
debts which is weapon against the threat of default obviously
a less palatable alternative than a heavy discount. The issue
still remains that future credit lines would be shaky even

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article has provided an up-to-date information on
the Nigerian external debt problem to permit some assessment of the current management efforts of the debt and
what other options are available for reducing the debt
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burden in the future.
The typical debt management process encompasses the
actions of creditors, debtors and the multilateral financial
institutions. Each set of participants contains within it
diverse views and interests which make debt negotiations
seemingly intractable. However, recent developments suggest
that the gap between the creditors and debtors could be
bridged by the application of emerging market-oriented
management options. Surprisingly, Nigeria's external debt
profile lacks sufficient quantification. But available data
strongly indicate that Nigeria's external debt problem has
deteriorated rapidly since the early 1980s and is currently
serious on the basis of principal debt indicators. Although
Nigeria is now considered to be a high-indebted country,
its debt problem is only significant to the extent that her
economic performance has been disappointing in the last
six years resulting in a situation of temporary credit unworthiness. Though Nigeria's poor record of economic
growth in the recent past could be ascribed to factors other
than the heavy debt burden, this latter problem has helped
to constrain quick recovery and the potential output growth.
Among several options, Nigeria has attempted to reduce
her debt burden through negotiations aimed at debt relief
and debt reduction which has resulted in lower debt service
payments. The principal instruments of this debt management strategy have been the embargo on external borrowing,
debt refinancing and rescheduling and debt conversion in the
form of debt-equity swaps. By any standard, Nigeria can be
said to have only minimally •applied all the tools of debt
management. There is room to apply more of the traditional
tools while the so-called "menu" approach throws up a
whole array of other options which rely more on market
transactions. The search for a co-operative and concerted
solution to the international crisis has definitely received a
lot of attention but it is doubtful whether we are now
nearer such a solution than in the early 1980s when the
debt crisis deepened. However, it is gratifying to observe
that the international community has clearly recognised the
dangers of the debt overhang in the poorest countries and
this may ultimately induce the emergence of a viable solution.
For a cowitry like Nigeria with a heavy debt burden,
debt management at the international level has become
something of a big jigzaw puzzle, but her efforts have been
credible under the circumstances. The main lesson to be
learnt from all these efforts is the need for debt management
to be part of sound macroeconomic policy. In other words,
debt management does not start only when there is a crisis.
On a continuous basis, Nigeria must scientifically determine
how much to borrow which should be properly related to
the economy's absorptive capacity for foreign capital and
ability to service the debt without experiencing external
payments problems. Similarly, it is important to monitor
meticulously the amount of debt. Accurate information on
external debt aids its efficient management on a day-to-day
basis and external borrowing strategies in the planning
framework.
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Table 1
NIGERIA: EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING (END OF PERIOD)
{N'Million)

· 1971-1977

V,

--..J

Total Debt Outstanding
Breakdown by Source(%)
Bilateral
Multilateral
Int. Capital Market
Refinanced Arrears
Unrefinanced Arrears
Others
Breakd<>wn By Type(%)
Medium/Longterm
Short term
Dollar Value of Debt
Outstanding (US $
million)
1

1987

1988 1

41,451.9 100,789.1

133,956.3

2.8
11.3
52.4
10.0
20.4
3.1

2.0
8.7
40.2
32.6
14.6
1.9

2.5
7.5
40.0
32.8
12.9
4.3

64.3
35.7

79.6
20.4

85.4
14.6

87.l
12.9

17,297.5

18,631.3

23,445.1

25,901.9

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

328.4

1,265.7

1,611.5

1,866.8

2,331.2

8,819.4

10,577.7

14,536.6

17,290.6

58.6
32.8

16.6
12.2
50.6

25.2
10.2
63.8

25.9
9.7
58.4

28.1
7.8
56.5

1.9
6.0
62.1

8.6

20.6

0.8

6.0

7.6

22.5
7.5

1.7
5.4
47.5
14.4
26.1
4.9

2.4
8.7
41.5
7.9
37.4
2.1

2.1
7.4
44.7
7.4
35.7
2.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

77.5
22.5

73.9
26.1

62.6
37.4

509.9

2,163.8

2,824.6

3,444.8

3,667.7

13,124.1

14,130.7

18,034.1

Figures as at September, 1988, except those of trade area which were as at December, 1988.

Source: Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lagos and Central Bank of Nigeria.

1986

Table 2
NIGERIA: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND PRINCIPAL DEBT RATIOS
(N'Million)

AVERAGE
1971-1977

V,

00

1978

1979

1980

1981

1,265.7
2,331.2
328.4
1,611.5 1,866.8
Total Debt Outstanding
30.4
160.8
182.9
110.4
5185
Total Debt Service
14.7
66.l
6.2
211.3
Principal
65.7
15.7
94.7
104.2
307.2
117.2
Interest
GDP At Current
17,457.4 34,540.1 41,974.3 49,632.3 57,569.8
Factor Cost
4,301.0
6,064.4 10,836.8 14,077.0 10,470.1
Total Exports
8,211.7
2,999.3
7,472.5 9,658.1 12,013.2
Total Imports
1,931.3
1,192.5
2,424.8
3,043.0 5,445.2
External Reserves
1.9
3.8
4.0
3.7
Debt/GDP(%)
3.8
7.6
20.9
13.3
22.3
Debt/Exports (%)
14.9
0.7
2.7
0.8
5.0
Debt Service Ratio(%)
1.7
0.4
0.7
2.9
1.1
Interest/Exports(%)
1.6
588.1
94.2
291.7
104.0
188.8
Reserves/Debt(%)
Reserves/Imports (No. of
1.74
4.89
6.77
2.42
7.73
months)

1982

1983

1984

1985

8,819.4
775.2
321.2
454.0

10,577.7
1,335.2
899.6
435.6

14,536.6
2,6405
1,856.9
783.6

58,830.1
8,722.5
12,565.5
1,026.6
14.9
101.l
8.9
5.2
11.6

60,679.0
7,502.5
8,903.7
725.2
17.4
141.0
17.8
5.8
6.9

68,662.1
9,088.0
7,178.3
1,080.0
21.2
160.0
29.1
8.6
7.4

0.98

0.98

Source: Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Central Bank of Nigeria.

1.81

1987

1988

17,290.6
3,718.0
2,737.5
980.5

41,451.9 100,789.1
2,502.2
3,590.6
1,515.0
1,338.8
987.2
2,251.8

133,956.3
8,012.5
2,878.6
5,133.9

78,775.6
11,720.8
7 .932.9
1,641.1
21.9
154.2
31.7
8.4
9.5

81,292.8 107,640.0
8,920.5 30,239.9
5,983.6 17,861.7
3,587.4
4,643.3
51.0
93.6
486.9
333.3
28.0
11.9
11.l
7.4
4.6
8.7

136,958.7
33,138.1
24,900.4
3,272.7
97.8
404.2
24.2
15.5
2.4

2.48

1986

7.19

3.12

1.58

Table 3

EXI'ERNAL DEBT AND GROWTH IN HIGHLY INDEBTRED COUNTRIES

I

Average Annual Growth Rates, 1982 - 1988

Debt Outstanding, 1988
Total
(US $ billion)

59.6
5.1
120.1
20.8
17.2
4.8
14.2
11.0

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

4.5
107.4
22.0
30.5
19.0
30.2
4.5
35.0
22.1

TOTAL

528.6

Per cent
Share

I

GDP

Exports

I

Investment

1.3

I

Per capita
Consumption

4.7
1.2
1.0

-2.0
3.6
-1.7
8.3
-4.8
-2.3
8.8
-1.0
0.5
-20.6
-6.0
2.4
1.2
-1.4
-1.7

-0.4
-1.6
2.6
-0.8
1.3
2.6
-2.1
-2.4
-0.3

2.9

-3.4

-1.5

0.2

1.9
-1.3
4.2
7.1
9.4
1.4
-1.0

3.6
5.7
0.8
6.6
4.2
100.0

2.6

5.8

Imports

-2.1
-16.7
2.8
15.1
-0.1
9.3
-9.0
-2.1
-2.2
-4.5
0.7
-10.1
-11.9
-12.0
-3.4
-1.6
0.2

1.4
-1.4
4.8
4.3
4.1
3.6
1.3
1.5
0.7
0.2
3.6
-0.3
2.9
-0.1
1.7
1.2
1.0

11.3
1.1
22.7
3.9
3.3
0.9
2.7
2.1
0.8
20.3
4.2

I

5.6

10.8
4.1
5.4
2.1
-1.1
5.5

5.6

-1.8
0.9
-4.5
-1.4
-0.6
1.0

-1.4
0.3

Source: The World Danie, World Debt Tables, 1988 (P. XVIII)

Table 4

NIGERIAN DEBT CONVERSION STATISTICS

AUCTION SESSIONS
30/11/88
No. of Participants
No. Fully Successful
No. Partially Successful
Total Bids ($ million)
Amount Redeemed($ million)
Discounted Redeemed($ million)
Discounted Redeemed (H million)
Applicable Exchange Rate $1 =
Effective Exchange Rate $1 =
Value of Discount ($ million)
Value of Discount (H million)
Average Discount for Successful Bidders(%)
Nigerian Commission($ million)

Source:

40
7
1
187.8
40.0
23.9
127.7
5.3364
3.1930
16.1
85.7
42.1
0.6

29/12/88
33
17
1
79.6
30.0
17.8
95.3
5.3530
3.1765
12.2
65.3
40.8
0.4

3/2/89
25
4
1
67.0
25.0
13.1
94.6
7.2476
3.7856
11.9
86.6
46.4
0.3

Debt Conversion Committee Secretariat, Central Danie of Nigeria, Lagos.
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31/3/89

4
3
8.0
3.0
1.6
12.0
7.5865
3.9959
1.4
10.8
47.3
0.04

28/4/89

23/6/89

22
13

11
7

66.2
33.6
17.0
128.4
1.5585
3.8250
16.6
125.3
48.9
0.4

30.2
29.1
15.3
111.0
7.2740
3.8125
13.9
100.8
48.6
0.4
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